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Abstract To investigate whether the theory of evolutionary
ethics is a valid explanation for the existence of ethical be-
haviour, we approach the ethical issues of morality from a
computational point-of-view. We define a model of multi-
agent societies, in which agents are able to evolve a moral
sense. In the model, moral sense is defined by every agent’s
personal set of rules, which determines its interaction with
other agents. By performing simulations of the model we
investigate under what circumstances the agents in the so-
cieties develop a moral sense which allows the society to
thrive. We use four conceptually different agent designs:
agents with a minimum of attributes, agents with family re-
lations, agents with a memory, and agents with reputation
in the society. From our results we conclude that there are
circumstances under which agents evolve ethical behaviour,
those circumstances being specific settings of family rela-
tions and reputation.
Keywords Ethics · Morality · Evolutionary algorithms ·
Multi-agent societies · Simulation
1 Introduction
What is morality, and how did the human race become in-
stilled with a moral sense? Philosophers such as Plato, Kant
[14], Spencer [20] and Huxley [12] sought to answer such
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questions through the formulation of ethical theories. Those
theories debate how individuals should behave and what ac-
tions should be considered ethical. The definition of moral-
ity plays a crucial role in the formulation of ethical theories.
The challenge of ethical theories formulated by the great
philosophers was that, whatever theory one devised, any at-
tempt to validate it was restricted to pure reasoning. Empiri-
cal experiments could not be executed because experiments
on ethics with people were (and are) considered unethical
themselves. Nowadays, the research domains of evolution-
ary computing and artificial life provide tools to execute em-
pirical experiments and provide arguments for and against
ethical theories.
Evolutionary ethics aims to bridge the gap between phi-
losophy and the natural sciences by arguing that natural se-
lection instilled human beings with a moral sense [9]. The
theory states that individuals in a society will have a higher
survival rate when their actions are based upon good morals.
Therefore, they have a higher chance to be selected in the
evolutionary cycle, which causes their moral behaviour to
spread to future generations.
Is the theory of evolutionary ethics a valid explanation
for the existence of ethical behaviour? Modern computers
provide powerful tools to execute empirical experiments in
this respect. In this paper, we present an artificial life model
of multi-agent societies, wherein the individual agents have
the possibility to evolve a moral sense. In the model, a moral
sense is defined by every agent’s personal set of behavioural
rules. The model is inspired by the previous work in this
field of research done by Epstein and Axtell [8], and Mas-
caro [16].
With our model we aim to investigate under what condi-
tions agents in a society will develop a common moral sense
that allows the society to thrive. We are particularly inter-
ested in the evolution of ethical behaviour. In our research,
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we defined different agent attributes and agent society con-
figurations. We allowed the agents to evolve a moral sense.
Whenever a thriving society was evolved, the nature of the
resulting set of behavioural rules was examined. The set can
have, for instance, an egoistic or altruistic nature, and there
might be specific rules which allow a society to thrive. We
interpreted the different ethical concepts by using the defin-
itions given by Jaffe [13].
The outline of this paper is as follows: Background ma-
terial for our research is given in Sect. 2. The society model
that we use is explained in Sect. 3. We performed four ex-
periments, namely with (1) baseline behaviour, described in
Sect. 4, (2) family relations, described in Sect. 5, (3) mem-
ory, described in Sect. 6, and (4) reputation, described in
Sect. 7. Our results are discussed in Sect. 8. Section 9 con-
cludes and looks at future work.
2 Background
In this section we provide background information on our
research. Section 2.1 describes the philosophy of evolution-
ary ethics. Section 2.2 describes in what sense our model can
be considered an artificial life model. Section 2.3 indicates
the little research that has been done in the area of ethics in
agent societies. Section 2.4 defines the behaviours that are
distinguished in our research.
2.1 Evolutionary Ethics
The term evolutionary ethics denotes an approach to natu-
ralistic moral philosophy which seeks to explain how moral
traits and behaviour evolved. Evolutionary ethics tries to
bridge the gap between philosophy and the natural sciences
by arguing that natural selection has instilled human beings
with a moral sense [9]. The theory entails that morality can
be understood as a phenomenon that arises during the evo-
lution of sociable, intelligent beings, and not as the result
of our rational faculties or of divine revelation. The theory
states that a group of individuals which base their actions
upon a moral sense will have a higher survival rate. Thus,
individuals with a moral sense that stimulates them to be-
have ethically would have a selective advantage.
According to the theory of evolution, natural selection
entails that, in general, only the fittest individuals in any
given population will survive and reproduce [6]. An organ-
ism’s evolutionary goal seems to be to promote its own fit-
ness in order to survive long enough to reproduce. In situa-
tions where an organism has to choose between enhancing
its own fitness and enhancing the fitness of others, the organ-
ism is expected to choose to enhance its own fitness. How-
ever, individuals frequently behave in ways that increase the
fitness of a group, where the members of the groups are usu-
ally of their own kind. This paradox of altruism, which is
supported by empirical facts [19], is one of the problems
evolutionary ethics are confronted with.
The paradox has implications for the theory of evolution-
ary ethics. For instance, if some moral traits are altruistic
in the evolutionary sense, then the evolutionary explanation
of altruism will be a part of the explanation of morality [5].
Darwin circumvented this problem for the theory of evo-
lution by stating that it was a mistake to think that natural
selection only operated on individuals [6].
Interdisciplinary approaches between scientists and phi-
losophers have the potential to generate important new
ideas, but the theory is confronted with a number of prob-
lems, such as the altruism-paradox. Empirical results from
the domain of computer science, for example the research
discussed in this paper, can help evolutionary ethics to over-
come some of these problems.
2.2 Artificial Life
Artificial life is a domain that studies natural life by attempt-
ing to recreate biological phenomena using computer simu-
lations which resemble those phenomena [15]. Artificial life
is often described as an attempt to understand high-level be-
haviour which is the result of low-level rules. Artificial life
complements the analytic approach of traditional biology
with a synthetic approach in which, rather than studying bi-
ological phenomena by taking apart living organisms to see
how they work, one attempts to put together systems that
behave as living organisms.
Behaviour which is not directly programmed in individ-
uals, but which does emerge from the interaction of individ-
uals with each other and with their environment, is called
“emergent behaviour” [17]. The simulation of our model,
described in Sect. 3, is an artificial life simulation. The dif-
ference between “regular” artificial life simulations and the
simulation of our model, is that in the first simple rules are
defined in individuals of the simulation to create emergent
behaviour of the entire system, while in our model we want
to evolve those behavioural rules. We use genetic algorithms
[10, 11] for this evolution process.
2.3 Ethics in Agent Societies
Epstein and Axtell [8] attempted to grow an artificial soci-
ety from the bottom up by defining simple local rules, which
were able to develop complex behaviour of the agents. An
example of such a simple rule for an agent is: “Move towards
the nearest spot with the most food available and collect all
the food from that spot.” When the individuals were placed
in a world with ‘food-mountains,’ the individuals showed
‘hiving’ behaviour. These experiments show that using sim-
ple local rules in agents can lead to interesting emergent be-
haviour within multi-agent societies.
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Mascaro [16] suggested using genetic algorithms to
evolve behaviours, and then analysing to what extent these
behaviours are ethical as defined by Utilitarianism [2]. The
simulation by Mascaro [16] allows the creation of basic en-
vironments, containing agents that are able to perform a fi-
nite number of actions dependent upon their own state and
the state of their immediate environment. Suicide, which is
the most extreme example of altruism, is one of the possible
actions of the agents. Including suicide in the agents’ be-
haviour may result in a stable society, which can cope with
variance in the availability of food by making the number of
agents correspond to the availability of food.
2.4 Social Behaviour
For our research, it is necessary to classify an evolved moral
sense of a society and compare classified moral senses with
each other to determine if there are significant differences.
For this classification, we need definitions of behaviour and
social interaction. The definitions introduced by Jaffe [13]
form a system that can be used in concrete situations such
as multi-agent societies. Jaffe’s system uses values for two
terms, namely (1) S, which is the benefit for the society,
and (2) I , which is the benefit for the individual. To classify
actions performed by agents, four different valuations are
distinguished:
Social investment (S ≥ 0, I ≥ 0): the action is useful for
both the society and the agent;
Destructive egoism (S < 0, I ≥ 0): the action harms so-
ciety but benefits the agent;
True altruism (S ≥ 0, I < 0): the agent makes a per-
sonal sacrifice for the good of society; and
Destructive behaviour (S < 0, I < 0): the action harms
both society and the agent.
These definitions are straightforward and create a frame-
work which can be used when doing research which involves
moral behaviour. We chose to classify actions of agents ac-
cording to these definitions. Moreover, we define a common
moral sense of a society as the average of executed actions
after a certain period in a society.
When do we consider a common moral sense to corre-
spond to ethical behaviour? Naturally, that depends on the
system of ethics that we prefer the agent society to subscribe
to. In most ethical systems, ethical behaviour has some con-
sideration for the good of the society as a whole, i.e., individ-
uals should be concerned with more than only their own wel-
fare. Therefore, within the confines of Jaffe’s system, ethical
behaviour means that the common moral sense should avoid
destructive egoism and destructive behaviour. Furthermore,
we are particularly interested in discovering whether it is
possible for an agent society to evolve support for some true
altruism, which would indicate that the good of the society
is an integral aspect of the common moral sense.
Fig. 1 The environment, 30 × 30 cells
3 Society Model
In this section we describe the design of our model, and
the simulation of this model which allows us to investigate
multi-agent societies that are capable of evolving a com-
mon moral sense. The model consists of agents, their moral
sense, and the environment in which the agents live. The
simulation of the model is responsible for running the model
and collecting statistics of executed experiments.
In Sect. 3.1 the general setup of the model is explained.
Section 3.2 describes the attributes of the agents, and
Sect. 3.3 describes their behavioural rules. Section 3.4 gives
the details of the mating process. Section 3.5 discusses how
a common moral sense is ascribed to an agent society. A de-
tailed description of the model’s implementation is given by
Berendsen [3].
3.1 The Environment
Our society model is situated in an environment, that con-
sists of a two-dimensional 30 × 30 grid. Each of the grid’s
cells may contain food and/or an agent. When a cell contains
food, it will only disappear when it is completely collected
by an agent. The environment is bounded by the edges, so
there is no wrap-around. A graphical example of the envi-
ronment can be seen in Fig. 1. At the start of an experiment,
the environment contains 200 agents, and 1% of the cells
contain food.
If an agent moves towards a cell where food is available
then the agent collects the food. The quantity of food that an
agent can collect from one cell is a maximum of 20 units.
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The food is uniformly distributed over the environment. The
factor of cells which receive new food every round are spec-
ified by a normal distribution, with a mean of 0.06 and a
standard deviation of 0.001.
The unit of time used in the society model is the ‘round.’
In our experiments, every run in the model will last 20,000
rounds. Each round every agent is allowed to execute one
action; this can be an action which is the result of a rule, of
the mating process, or of instinct. The order of agents which
are allowed to execute actions is randomly determined.
When an agent is selected, it automatically consumes part
of its health and ages one round. The agent will then test
whether it is capable of starting the mating process. If the
agent succeeds to mate with another agent, both agents have
finished their action for the round. When an agent is not able
to start a mating process, it will try to execute one of its rules.
An agent is only able to execute one rule, and when it has
done so, the agent has finished its round. If the agent fails to
execute any of its rules, it will follow its instinct, which is to
forage food.
3.2 Agent Attributes
An agent distinguishes itself from other agents by its char-
acteristics and its behavioural rules. The characteristics are
based on the work of Epstein and Axtell [8] and Mascaro
[16]. The distinguishing characteristics of the agents are age
and health.
Age: The age of an agent is defined by the number of
rounds the agent has been alive. An agent can live for a max-
imum of 100 rounds. The age attribute is introduced to set a
natural cap on the agents’ lifetimes.
Health: Each agent has an associated number called
“health.” An agent loses 10 units of health each round.
Health is replenished by consuming food, whether foraged,
stolen, or gifted. If the health of an agent reaches zero, the
agent dies. An agent which is created at the beginning of
a run in the model will have 100 units of health. An agent
which is created through the mating process inherits 25% of
the health of each of its parents. There is no upper limit on
the health for an agent, thus health is an element of N. The
health attribute is used as the fitness measure for agents. If
an agent has more health, it is considered to be more suc-
cessful. This measure is commonly used in artificial life and
multi-agent society studies [8, 16, 18].
An agent’s field of vision determines how many cells the
agent can see across the environment. An agent can see in
the four principal lattice directions: North, South, East, and
West. An example of an agent with a vision of 3 can be seen
in Fig. 2. All agents in the simulation have a vision of 3,
which enables the agents to explore their near surroundings
and find food and partners to mate with.
Fig. 2 An agent in a part of the environment with a vision of 3; the
grayed area is visible to the agent
3.3 Agent Behaviour
An agent is purely reactive, which means that the actions
it can execute depend on its characteristics, the character-
istics of neighbouring agents, and the nearby environment.
Every agent has between 5 and 7 behavioural rules, which
are ordered by specificity. These rules are responsible for the
actions of the agent and define its personal moral sense. The
rules consist of tests and actions which can be represented
as: “TEST ∧ TEST → ACTION.”
The first part of a rule is the condition under which the
action of the rule will be executed. A condition consists of
one or more tests. All tests must be satisfied for the condi-
tion to be satisfied. The tests can refer to the age and health
attributes of a certain agent, and the availability of food in
the neighbourhood. There are five possibilities to refer to
an agent within the vision range of the owner of the rule,
namely (1) the owner of the rule itself, (2) the closest agent,
(3) the furthest agent, (4) the strongest agent, and (5) the
weakest agent. The tests can also contain mathematical and
logical operators, wildcards, and numbers. An example of a
condition of a rule is: “if closest-agent age < 10 AND self
health < 20.” This condition contains two test clauses and
will only succeed when both of them are true.
The second part of the rule is an action, which is the result
of successful tests. There are four different actions: wander,
forage, steal, and share. Share and steal are actions which
involve interaction between two agents. The agent that is
stolen from or shared with, is selected by the condition of
the rule which has steal or share as action. When a condition
consists of multiple test clauses, the agent from the last test
clause is used as target for the steal or share action. If the
target agent is the owner of the rule itself, a random agent in
the vision range is selected. The four actions are defined as
follows.
Wander: The wander action of an agent implements a
move of random length. This position can be as far as the
agent’s vision permits. The agent can move in any of the
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four lattice directions. If an agent moves to a cell where food
is positioned, the agent will collect food, up to a maximum
of 20 units (which translates to 20 units of health). Wander
is a neutral action; only when an agent encounters food by
chance it is positive, otherwise the action has no benefit. The
wander action is characterised as social investment.
Forage: The forage action simulates the harvesting be-
haviour of an agent. The agent looks for cells in the envi-
ronment where food is available, as far as the agent’s vision
permits. The agent then moves to a randomly-chosen cell
with food, and collects food from that cell, up to a maxi-
mum of 20 units. Forage is an egoistic, but positive action.
The forage action is characterised as social investment.
Steal: When an agent executes the steal action it tries to
steal health from a neighbouring agent specified in the test
of the rule. The amount of health which is stolen is 25 units.
Steal is typically an asocial and egoistic action; the agent
who executes the steal action is the only one who benefits
from it and the victim agent is harmed. The steal action is
characterised as destructive egoism.
Share: The share action allows an agent to share its
wealth (measured in health) with another agent. When an
agent shares, it gives away 25% its health to the agent spec-
ified in the test of the rule. Share is an altruistic action; the
sharing agent gives away his own health for the benefit of
another agent. The share action is characterised as true al-
truism.
Note that there is no action which can be classified as de-
structive behaviour. We excluded this possibility intention-
ally, because its destructive nature would obstruct the evolu-
tion of societies. Moreover, arguably it is a kind of behaviour
that has no survival ability at all.
3.4 Mating
The mating behaviour is the same for all agents, although the
characteristics and rules of the resulting child-agent of the
mating process depend on its parents. An agent tries to mate
with another agent before it tries to execute its behavioural
rules. The mating process is divided into three parts.
The first part checks whether the agent which starts the
mating process satisfies the mating requirements. These re-
quirements consist of tests against the age and the health of
the agent. An agent has to be alive for at least 18 rounds
and must have at least 50 units of health. The idea is that
an agent must be of a certain age and have a certain level of
health to mate, because we are only interested in agents who
can survive to reproduce.
The second part of the mating process is finding a suitable
partner. Partners have to be located in one of the four lattice
directions of the agent and have to be within its range of
vision. The agent randomly chooses one of its neighbours to
be its partner for the mating process. The partner has to meet
the same age and health requirements as the initiating agent.
The last part of the mating process is responsible for the
creation of the child agent. The parents donate 25% of their
health to the child. The child is placed on an empty cell near
one of the two parents. It is possible that the child is placed
on a cell where food is available, which results in a higher
initial health for the agent.
The behavioural rules of the child are determined by the
uniform crossover operator [10]. For each part within the
chromosome that defines the rules of the child, one of the
parents is chosen. In the model this means that for all parts
of the rules there is a 50% chance that the part is chosen
from parent 1 and 50% chance that it is chosen from par-
ent 2. An example of the uniform crossover operator in the
simulation can be seen in Fig. 3, where one rule of each par-
ent is combined to create one rule for a child. The rules of
the child also have a 2% chance of being mutated. The mu-
tate operator changes a part of the rule into something else.
It is also possible that the condition of a rule is expanded or
contracted with a test clause, but there is a minimum of zero
and a maximum of two test clauses.
3.5 Classification of Moral Sense
The statistics that are gathered during a run are used to inves-
tigate the moral sense of the agents within a society. There
are three kinds of statistics gathered: (1) statistics on the
demographics of the society, (2) statistics on the actions of
agents that were executed during a run, and (3) statistics on
the rule sets of the agents.
We classify a rule set by looking at the executed actions
by all agents of a society in the last 5,000 rounds of a run.
Only actions executed by agents which survived at least to
the mating age are taken into account, because we are only
interested in adult agents which are strong enough to survive
and mate. The common moral sense of the society consists
of the averages of the moral evaluation of the actions in the
rule set. For example, a common moral sense may consist of
30% social investment, 25% destructive egoism, and 45%
true altruism, when in the last rounds of the run the agents
executed an average of 10% wander, 20% forage, 25% steal,
and 45% share actions. We discount any actions which are
executed less than 1% of the time, as, due to the mutation
factor, it is impossible that specific actions are completely
removed from a rule set. We therefore assume that such rare
action are not a significant part of the common moral sense.
4 Baseline Behaviour
The goal of the first experiment was to set a baseline for
the results for the subsequent experiments. We were partic-
ularly interested to see whether the society would evolve to
rule out destructive egoism, and perhaps would even allow
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Fig. 3 Uniform crossover
operator applied to behavioural
rules






some true altruism. We ran 20 repetitions of an experiment
with the basic settings as explained in Sect. 3. Table 1 shows
the average percentage of actions executed, as well as the
standard deviation.
From Table 1 we conclude that there are only two be-
havioural actions of the agents which are responsible for the
common moral sense of the agents, namely forage and steal.
The common moral sense is egoistic, as agents are only
looking after themselves. The single goal of an agent is to
gather as much food as possible, doing that by searching for
food, or by stealing food from neighbours.
Foraging is an easy way to obtain health and to ensure
survival, which does not depend on the cooperation with
other individuals. Stealing is another easy way to obtain
health and to ensure survival, but at the cost of a different
agent. Because there is no direct punishment on stealing
from other agents, there is no difference for an agent be-
tween stealing and gathering food, except for the execution
of the action itself. Obviously, the society as a whole can-
not support only stealing agents, lest it would die out. But a
large amount of stealing is certainly viable, and is therefore
evolved. Sharing food, within such a society, will probably
lead to early starvation.
The evolved societies are stable. Fluctuations in numbers
of agents and food availability are small, and the average
health and age of the agents remains the same throughout a
run. Figure 4 shows the food and population size of the first
5,000 rounds of a typical run. The upper line is the availabil-
ity of food in every round, counted as the number of cells in
the environment which have food available and are not oc-
cupied by an agent. The lower line is the population size in
every round. As can be seen in the figure, the society reaches
its fairly stable state within the first 1,000 rounds of a run.
Fig. 4 The available food (upper line) and the population size (lower
line) in the first 5,000 rounds of a run
To investigate whether the availability of food would
change the common moral sense of the societies, we varied
the mean food distribution within the interval [0.02, 0.09],
with steps of 0.01 (0.06 being the default setting). While
this significantly influenced the percentages of social invest-
ment and destructive egoism (with increasing availability of
food, the agents’ tendency to steal increased also), this did
not introduce true altruistic behaviour. Changing other para-
meters, such as the number of initial agents, the availability
of initial food, the initial health of the agents, and changes to
size of the environment, did not result in a significant change
of the results.
Why are the agents not behaving altruistically? A possi-
ble explanation is that altruistic agents lose their own health
by helping others. There is no direct or indirect benefit for an
altruistic agent, since it loses health and the receiving agent
will not remember that it received health from another agent.
Furthermore, the society does not benefit from altruistic be-
haviour, as agents are able to live and survive without the
help of other agents.
5 Family Relations
In the second experiment, the agents in our model are ex-
tended with parent-child relations to examine if such rela-
tions will enable societies to develop a more altruistic moral
sense. The idea behind family relations is that children can-
not survive without the help of the parents. Incorporating
this idea in our model will bind parents to their offspring
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and may possibly result in family structures in which altru-
istic behaviour is executed.
To accomplish that parents are able to help their children,
it is necessary for the parents to be able to identify their chil-
dren. We extended the agents with knowledge of its children.
The language of the rules was extended by adding “child”
to possible agents used in the tests. When a test of a rule
includes “child,” the tests are executed on a neighbouring
child of the owner of the rule.
An agent is a child in the first 5 rounds of its lifetime.
Children are characterised by the following four features:
(1) a child has a vision of 1, which means it will only move
to a cell adjacent to itself, (2) a child is only able to steal 3
health from another agent, (3) a child is only able to share
3 health with other agents, and (4) a child can only con-
sume 3 health from a space with food on it. The mating
process is altered such that children have 40 health when
they are created. These alterations are responsible for simu-
lating weak children and exclude the possibility that agents
survive childhood without the help of their parents.
To our initial dismay, we found out that running a simu-
lation of our model with these settings for 20 runs, resulted
in 20 extinct societies. Each of the societies died out within
the first 150 rounds of its run. There are at least two reasons
why the societies do not survive. First, children are an easy
victim for agents who steal, and a child is unlikely to sur-
vive the theft. Second, the initial behaviour of agents must
already include sharing with children, and this trait must be
transferred to children, both of which are not statistically
likely.
Thus, we decided to also extend the agents with a parental
instinct. This means that if the agent does not find an action
to execute in its behavioural rules, it will share with its child.
Parental instinct is not counted as an executed share action,
because it is not part of the evolved rule set. Parental in-
stinct enabled the societies to survive and the resulting aver-
age percentage of executed actions can be found in Table 2.
Although surviving societies are found, the common moral
sense did not include true altruism. The children survived
because of the parental instinct, making sharing unneces-
sary for the survival of the societies. This results in the same
situation as the baseline model from Sect. 4.
We then continued the experiment by removing the
parental instinct, but increasing the number of initial agents
Table 3 Percentages of executed actions, averaged over 20 runs, with





to 900, resulting in a fully-occupied initial environment.
This could be the solution to the problem of not having
a sufficient initial number of sharing agents in a run. We
also removed the steal action from the agents in the model,
which could solve the problem of children being the victim
of stealing agents.
Of 2,000 executed runs, only 20 resulted in a surviving
society. Table 3 shows the average of executed actions in the
last 5,000 of 20,000 rounds of those 20 surviving runs. Run-
ning the simulation of our model with the above described
settings does result in surviving societies, but the probabil-
ity that a society survives is very small. The results from
Table 3 show that the resulting common moral sense con-
sists of about 15% true altruism. Examining the rule set,
we found that, indeed, parents behaved altruistically towards
their children.
From the results of the second experiment we make three
observations:
1. Weak children do not survive, because parents do not be-
have altruistically towards their children. This results in
the extinction of the entire society;
2. When we extend the agents with a parental instinct, the
societies are able to survive, but the common moral sense
does not include altruistic behaviour; and
3. Large populations with weak children and family rela-
tions do not survive, except when altruistic behaviour
evolves in the common moral sense and when stealing
behaviour is excluded.
The results of the experiments with family relations with-
out stealing behaviour show that a common moral sense is
evolved in which agents decide to help other agents by shar-
ing their belongings. The results provide arguments to be-
lieve that the theory of evolutionary ethics is a valid expla-
nation for the existence of a moral sense, but in our model
only with highly specific parameters.
6 Memory
In the third experiment the agents from the basic settings
discussed in Sect. 4 were extended with memory. The rea-
son why we implemented memory is that it could lead to a
more altruistic common moral sense, because agents will be
able to remember whether other agents interacted positively
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or negatively with them. To extend the agents with a mem-
ory, they need a list of agents who interacted with them. For
each other agent they keep a balance of how much these
other agents shared with them, and how much they stole
from them. A positive balance indicates more sharing than
stealing, and a negative balance more stealing than sharing.
To enable agents to identify friendly and hostile agents in
their rules, the language of the rules was altered. Instead of
using the closest, furthest, weakest, and strongest agent, we
used friendly, hostile, and neutral agents to test characteris-
tics against. These agents are specified as follows.
Friendly agent: The neighbouring agent with the most
positive balance between the owner of the rule and the
neighbouring agent, is defined as the friendly agent. If there
is no neighbouring agent with a positive balance, the test
will fail.
Hostile agent: The neighbouring agent with the most
negative balance between the owner of the rule and the
neighbouring agent, is defined as the hostile agent. If there is
no neighbouring agent with a negative balance, the test will
fail.
Neutral agent: The neighbouring agent with a balance
of zero between the owner of the rule and the neighbouring
agent, is defined as the neutral agent. When there are more
agents which satisfy these requirements, one is randomly
chosen as the target. If there are no neighbouring agents with
a balance of zero, the test will fail.
Table 4 gives the results for the experiment with agents
with memory. These results show that, while the amount
of stealing that occurs is reduced compared to the baseline
model (Sect. 4), individual memory does not lead to a more
altruistic common moral sense. An explanation for this is
that agents, due to their relatively short lifetimes and abil-
ity to move, do not interact often enough with each other
to build up a memory which could influence the common
moral sense.
7 Reputation
The memory of agents introduced in Sect. 6 did not result
in an altruistic common moral sense, arguably because of a
lack of interaction. We therefore introduced reputation in the
Table 5 Percentages of executed actions, averaged over 20 runs, with






agents. Reputation can be seen as a global memory, every
agent having a friendly, hostile, or neutral reputation to all
other agents. Reputation is incorporated in the model, based
on the model used in Sect. 6, by giving the basic agents
a friendly, hostile, or neutral reputation. We experimented
with three different settings of reputation, which are defined
as follows.
Basic setting: The reputation of an agent is increased
when the agent decides to share with another agent, and de-
creased when the agent decides to steal from an other agent.
A friendly agents is an agent which shared more than it stole
in its lifetime and a hostile agent is an agent which stole
more than it shared in its lifetime.
Friendly forever: When an agent decides to share with
another agent, it receives a friendly reputation which will
last until the agent dies.
Hostile forever: When an agent decides to steal from an-
other agent, it receives a hostile reputation which will last
until the agent dies.
Table 5 lists the results of the basic setting of reputa-
tion. We examined only societies in which instinct no longer
plays a role in the gathering of food. The results show that,
while the amount of stealing is reduced compared to the
baseline model, there is no significant altruistic behaviour
in the evolved societies. Actually, the results are quite sim-
ilar to those achieved with the experiment with memory
(Sect. 6).
Table 6 lists the results of the friendly forever setting of
reputation. Again, we used only societies which evolved to
a state in which the instinct is no longer used by the agents.
The results show us that altruistic behaviour becomes a
small but significant part of the common moral sense of so-
cieties. Investigating the rule sets of evolved societies shows
that agents have rules which prescribe to share with friendly
or neutral agents.
Table 7 lists the results of the hostile forever setting
of reputation. Once more, we used only societies which
evolved to a state in which the instinct is no longer used
by the agents. The results show that, compared to all other
models tested, there is significantly less destructive egoism
behaviour. However, altruistic behaviour is not included in
the common moral sense. Investigating the rule sets from
evolved societies shows that agents have rules which pre-
scribe to steal from hostile agents. This leads to a situation in
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which hostile agents steal from other hostile agents, which
has as a result that hostile agents have a high chance of not
surviving to the mating age.
8 Discussion
Can our results contribute to the discussion of the theory of
evolutionary ethics? From our personal view they can: even
though our model is a simplistic representation of the real
world, it can simulate the evolution of a moral sense in a
society. Complex interaction between individuals within a
society are supported, and through reproduction and death,
a moral sense is generated.
Our results show that adding even a little bit of complex-
ity to the agents in the society reduces the amount of destruc-
tive egoism professed by the agents. However, the results
show also that evolving an altruistic common moral sense is
not as evident as expected. In a number of situations an al-
truistic common moral sense did indeed evolve, but in other
situations where an altruistic moral sense was expected it
did not evolve. It is possible that this is the result of the sim-
plicity of the agents in our model, or because of assumptions
made when we defined our model. However, we got the im-
pression that evolving ethical behaviour in general (such as
the behaviour we see in human societies and many animal
societies) is not as obvious as it seems.
Computer science and ethics are two research domains
which are rarely combined, even though computer science
can offer a wide range of new insights into problems which
are considered to be solved by philosophers. When com-
puter science, and especially social simulations, are com-
bined with ethics, this is usually done with the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma [1, 4, 7, 21]. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma
can offer interesting insights into ethics, but the problem it-
self is rather simple. The simplicity of the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma is also its power, because it has only a limited num-
ber of outcomes, thus conclusions and explanations are rela-
tively easy to provide. The danger of drawing conclusions
from research done with the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
is that it is hard to say something about ethics in general
or ethical behaviour within humans. The iterated prisoner’s
dilemma is just a model of a simple problem with a limited
number of choices.
We presented a more complex model, which incorporates
interaction between agents that are free to move around and
reproduce. Our model also offers a very large number of
possible experiments for evolving a moral sense. We should
add that, naturally, even with this more complex model we
can not draw hard conclusions about moral sense in the “real
world.”
9 Conclusion
We experimented with four different conceptual designs of
the agents in a model of agents societies: agents with a min-
imum of attributes, agents with family relations, agents with
a memory, and agents with reputation in the society. The
baseline experiments with agents with a minimum of at-
tributes resulted in egoistic societies. The introduction of
family relations resulted in societies which were unable to
survive, except when parental instinct was added or highly
specific parameters were used. With those specific parame-
ters a common moral sense was found which consisted for
15% of altruistic behaviour. The introduction of memory re-
sulted in the same egoistic societies as with the agents with a
minimum of attributes. The results of experiments with rep-
utation depend on the setting of reputation which is used; in
certain settings an altruistic common moral sense was found.
We answer the research question that we posed in Sect. 1
as follows: In every experiment, except for the test with fam-
ily relations and weak children, the agents developed a com-
mon moral sense which allowed their society to thrive. The
evolved common moral sense was almost always a mixture
of destructive egoism and social investment, which means
it was decidedly egoistic. However, compared to the base-
line society that used the simplest agents, all societies had
a significantly reduced amount of destructive egoism. Fur-
thermore, a more altruistic moral sense was found in two
society configurations, namely (1) with family relations, a
large initial number of agents, and no stealing, and (2) with
a friendly-forever reputation setting.
In future work, more actions for the agents can be incor-
porated in the model. Suggestions for such actions are ‘kill’
and ‘suicide.’ Mascaro [16] suggests ‘rape,’ ‘abortion,’ and
‘racism.’ Another possible extension is the introduction of
tribes.
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Is the theory of evolutionary ethics a valid explanation
for the existence of ethical behaviour? In very simple soci-
eties in nature, for example bacterial colonies, we do not ob-
serve altruistic behaviour. However, altruistic behaviour of-
ten occurs in more complex societies, even relatively simple
ones such as ant colonies. Our experiments show that ethi-
cal behaviour can evolve even in a simple society, given the
right circumstances. This lends credibility to the idea that
in a highly complex society, such as our human one, good
morals may very well be the result of evolutionary ethics.
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